{"id":"CVE-2026-99230","published":"2026-11-02T16:17:47.927","lastModified":"2026-11-02T16:17:47.927","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/cmd: don't leave list poison in ->hash_node\n\nio_uring_cmd_del_cancelable() uses hlist_del() to take a command off\n->cancelable_uring_cmd, which leaves LIST_POISON1/2 behind in\n->hash_node. Requests are recycled through the request cache without\nbeing reinitialised, and not every user of ->hash_node sets it up before\nit is used:\n\nIf a vectored futex wait is woken while futex_wait_multiple_setup() is\nstill queueing the futexes, io_futexv_wait() doesn't add the request to\n->futex_list, and leaves the completion to the task_work queued by the\nwake up. io_futexv_complete() ends in __io_futex_complete(), whose\nhlist_del_init() is fine for a request that is unhashed, which is how all\nother users of the node leave it. If the request was a cancelable\nuring_cmd in its previous life, e.g. a ublk FETCH_REQ, it writes through\nLIST_POISON2:\n\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n  KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-...]\n  RIP: 0010:io_futexv_complete+0x219/0x420\n  Call Trace:\n   tctx_task_work_run+0x804/0x950\n   tctx_task_work+0x71/0xa0\n   task_work_run+0x118/0x200\n\nLeave the node unhashed.","cvssScore":null,"cvssSeverity":null,"cvssVector":null,"cwes":[],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d5af21422060c088f6e4fb0f1e7dcf5bcdd6707","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/685b49483200384d7f49d338af476e26e6824637","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc7f13d006fcefed9564bd79f135b51d344e9c77","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}