{"id":"CVE-2026-99113","published":"2026-10-28T11:17:30.773","lastModified":"2026-10-28T11:17:30.773","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: zero the FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION buffer before filling it in\n\nsmb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 64 bytes for FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION,\nthat is the whole of struct object_id_info, but writes only 46 of them:\n\n - objid[] is 16 bytes, and when the volume UUID is not available only\n   sizeof(stfs.f_fsid) (8) bytes are copied into it;\n - extended_info.version_string[] is STRING_LENGTH (28) bytes, and only\n   strlen(\"1.1.0\") (5) bytes are copied into it.\n\nThe response buffer is zeroed on allocation (kvzalloc() in\nsmb2_allocate_rsp_buf()), so for a standalone request the remaining 31\nbytes are zero.  In a compound request they need not be.  The offset of\nthe next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one,\nso if a preceding command wrote its reply into the buffer and then\nfailed, smb2_set_err_rsp() pins only the short error response and the\nnext reply lands inside the area that has already been written.  Only\nthe header is cleared there:\n\n\tmemset((char *)rsp_hdr, 0, sizeof(struct smb2_hdr) + 2);\n\nThe client then receives up to 31 bytes of a response it was not meant\nto see, including one that failed with an access denied error.\n\nClear the structure before filling it in.  As a side effect\nversion_string is now NUL terminated.","cvssScore":null,"cvssSeverity":null,"cvssVector":null,"cwes":[],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/015fffa48e96ca8d73a627445341ccff86b02251","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/399aa12450a61a5c73dc77e73f069ece9687c95d","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/898cb4f2e12a5ddea1b2d821cc642c3100f46da7","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}