{"id":"CVE-2026-99042","published":"2026-10-23T13:17:27.610","lastModified":"2026-10-24T14:16:53.347","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/net: populate CONNECT filter fields for 24-byte sockaddr_in6\n\nio_connect_bpf_populate() fills connect.port and connect.v6_addr for\nAF_INET6 only when addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6), i.e. 28\nbytes.\n\nThe IPv6 connect paths accept SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 (24 bytes), which\nalready holds sin6_port and sin6_addr. io_connect() passes addr_len to\nthe socket layer unchanged.\n\nAt addr_len 24 the filter sees family AF_INET6 with port and address\nzero, while the kernel connects to the real destination. A filter that\ndenies an IPv6 port or address is bypassed. Denying connect.port == P\nrejects [::1]:P with -EACCES at addr_len 28 but connects at addr_len 24.\n\nUse SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 as the threshold. sin6_scope_id stays zero when\nabsent.\n\nThe threshold mismatch was found by an AI coding assistant (Claude Code)\ncomparing this hook against the net/ipv6 length checks on my\ninstructions; it also drafted the reproducer and this patch. I verified\nthe bypass and the fix in a VM on 7.3-rc6 and that 7.2 has the same\ncode.","cvssScore":8.4,"cvssSeverity":"HIGH","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","cwes":[],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/596a955d2d01b7e29d9fed60ebcf7c4ba518b8e5","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa5d5f8e502318e783545ba5d04bb40130b83e20","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}