{"id":"CVE-2026-65197","published":"2026-10-13T15:17:46.690","lastModified":"2026-10-16T19:56:15.773","description":"H3C HDM Family-A verifies the RSA signature of a firmware image against a public key it reads from the mutable file `/conf/public.pem`. That file is writable by an authenticated Redfish client through the `UpdateService.UploadSignKey` action, which stores the uploaded body verbatim after validating only that the multipart filename ends in `.pem`. An administrator, or any account with `firmware-update` privilege, can therefore replace the trust anchor with their own key, sign a malicious image with the matching private key, and have it pass verification. Family-A has no hardware root-of-trust (no PFR) to catch the substituted key. \n\nThis was observed on H3C HDM Family-A G5 HDM 6.14.01. H3C HDM Family-A G3/G5 builds carrying the Redfish/DRE update tree appear to be affected. HDM2 uses a different update path and is not covered by this finding.","cvssScore":3.1,"cvssSeverity":"LOW","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","cwes":["CWE-347"],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://www.runzero.com/advisories/h3c-hdm-firmware-verification-key-replacement-cve-2026-65197","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}