{"id":"CVE-2026-57144","published":"2026-10-23T13:17:11.370","lastModified":"2026-10-23T13:17:11.490","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.110 to before version 4.6.61, praisonai.sandbox.SandlockSandbox is documented and implemented as the kernel-enforced sandbox backend for untrusted code. Its SandboxConfig.native() path lets callers configure allowed filesystem paths and network=False. On systems where the optional sandlock module imports but reports that Landlock is unavailable, SandlockSandbox.execute() and run_command() do not fail closed. They silently fall back to SubprocessSandbox(self.config). That fallback keeps the same high-level native policy object but does not enforce the native filesystem or network boundary during code execution. A sandboxed payload can read files outside the configured allowed path and open network connections despite network=False. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.","cvssScore":8.8,"cvssSeverity":"HIGH","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","cwes":["CWE-266","CWE-668","CWE-693"],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6jcq-6546-qrrw","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6jcq-6546-qrrw","tags":[]}],"hasPoc":true,"ai":null}