{"id":"CVE-2026-55675","published":"2026-10-13T16:17:21.890","lastModified":"2026-10-13T17:17:42.177","description":"The Salty documentation repository builds and deploys the docs.saltbox.dev website. Prior to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220, .github/workflows/trigger-pr-build.yml records an untrusted fork commit in the pr_info artifact, and the secret-bearing workflow_run job in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml checks out that commit before running pip install -r requirements.txt. A fork pull request can therefore supply attacker-authored setup.py or PEP 517 build hooks whose installation code executes in the privileged base-repository workflow with CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing secret disclosure and follow-on compromise. The vulnerability is not caused by the repository-fork guard, and the demonstrated path requires attacker control of fork content rather than merely the artifact metadata. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220.","cvssScore":10,"cvssSeverity":"CRITICAL","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","cwes":["CWE-94","CWE-829","CWE-1357"],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/saltyorg/docs/commit/649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/saltyorg/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-wr2h-fpxm-ff4x","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/saltyorg/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-wr2h-fpxm-ff4x","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[{"url":"https://github.com/saltyorg/docs/commit/649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/saltyorg/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-wr2h-fpxm-ff4x","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/saltyorg/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-wr2h-fpxm-ff4x","tags":[]}],"hasPoc":true,"ai":{"summary":"A GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability allows untrusted fork commits to execute malicious Python code with high-privilege secrets, potentially leading to complete repository compromise and secret disclosure.","exploitability":"Easy to exploit with a malicious fork PR that includes attacker-controlled setup.py or build hooks, requiring only the ability to create a fork and submit a pull request to the target repository.","blast_radius":"High impact as attackers can access and potentially exfiltrate multiple sensitive API keys and tokens including CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, enabling further compromise of the repository and connected services.","remediation":"Upgrade to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220 which fixes the workflow to properly validate fork commits before checking them out.","detection":"Monitor for unusual workflow_run events in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml that check out commits from untrusted forks, particularly those with modified setup.py or build hooks in the pr_info artifact.","tags":["gha","secrets","supply-chain","ci-cd"],"model":"garnet-coder","analyzedAt":"2026-10-14T08:44:27.291Z"}}