{"id":"CVE-2026-54630","published":"2026-10-23T04:18:17.007","lastModified":"2026-10-23T19:36:32.410","description":"Part-DB is an open source inventory management system for electronic components. Prior to version 2.12.1, the part attachment upload handler stores uploaded files under the web-served media directory using the client-supplied file extension, and its extension blocklist does not include phar. AttachmentSubmitHandler::renameBlacklistedExtensions() rewrites dangerous extensions (php, phtml, sh, cgi, py, js, html, htaccess, ...) to .txt, but phar is absent from the list, so a .phar file keeps its extension. Public attachments (the default) are written into public/media/, which is the Apache document root. The shipped Apache configuration routes .phar to PHP-FPM, so the stored file is executed as PHP on request. The per-attachment-type extension filter is empty by default and is not consulted by the upload handler in a way that blocks this, and a non-admin user in the default users group can create an attachment type with no filter and attach files to parts. Any authenticated user in the default users group uploads a .phar attachment to a part and fetches it under /media/, executing arbitrary PHP as the www-data web user. Ability to exploit depends on the webserver config, docker image contained the vulnerability by default. This issue has been patched in version 2.12.1.","cvssScore":9.6,"cvssSeverity":"CRITICAL","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","cwes":["CWE-434"],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Part-DB/Part-DB-server/releases/tag/v2.12.1","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/Part-DB/Part-DB-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w5m7-3xf7-6g7g","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[{"url":"https://github.com/Part-DB/Part-DB-server/releases/tag/v2.12.1","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/Part-DB/Part-DB-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w5m7-3xf7-6g7g","tags":[]}],"hasPoc":true,"ai":{"summary":"Part-DB's attachment upload handler allows authenticated users to upload PHAR files with no extension filtering, and the web server executes them as PHP due to misconfiguration, leading to remote code execution.","exploitability":"Authenticated non-admin users in the default group can exploit this by uploading a crafted .phar file and accessing it via the public media directory; exploitation requires only standard HTTP requests.","blast_radius":"Successful exploitation grants the attacker full control of the web server process (www-data), enabling data theft, further lateral movement, or persistence within the infrastructure.","remediation":"Upgrade to Part-DB version 2.12.1 or later, which adds .phar to the extension blocklist and fixes the upload handler logic.","detection":"Look for HTTP requests to /media/ paths returning executable content (e.g., PHP execution) or unusual file creation events in the media directory with .phar extensions; check web server access logs for such requests and correlate with user authentication logs.","tags":["rce","phar","upload","webapp","misconfig"],"model":"garnet-coder","analyzedAt":"2026-10-26T08:45:14.285Z"}}