{"id":"CVE-2026-53942","published":"2026-10-23T15:17:32.157","lastModified":"2026-10-23T19:42:24.553","description":"Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.","cvssScore":9.9,"cvssSeverity":"CRITICAL","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L","cwes":["CWE-94"],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/commit/9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/security/advisories/GHSA-pf87-fcg3-wjfh","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[{"url":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/commit/9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/security/advisories/GHSA-pf87-fcg3-wjfh","tags":[]}],"hasPoc":true,"ai":{"summary":"A GitHub Actions workflow in conda/conda executes an external template-rendering action using attacker-controlled repository and branch references obtained from a pull request comment trigger, allowing an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution via unsandboxed Jinja2 template rendering with elevated privileges.","exploitability":"Exploitation requires an authenticated attacker with permission to comment on issues or pull requests in the affected repository and craft a malicious comment containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate, along with a PR-controlled repository and branch pointing to a malicious template.","blast_radius":"Successful exploitation would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the GitHub Actions runner, potentially compromising secrets, infrastructure, and downstream users relying on the conda ecosystem.","remediation":"Upgrade to commit 9c0f238 or later in the conda/conda repository, which patches the vulnerability by sandboxing the Jinja2 environment and removing unsanitized template rendering from the PR-triggered workflow path.","detection":"Monitor GitHub Actions workflow runs triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate for execution of external actions (e.g., conda/actions/template-files) that perform unsandboxed template rendering; look for unusual checkout of non-default repositories or branches in the workflow run logs.","tags":["rce","github-actions","template-injection","pr-pwn","privilege-escalation"],"model":"garnet-coder","analyzedAt":"2026-10-24T08:52:24.896Z"}}