{"id":"CVE-2026-115863","published":"2026-10-23T18:17:21.757","lastModified":"2026-10-23T19:43:46.190","description":"ConnMan through 2.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow via a DHCPv6 Reply message. This occurs in get_domains in gdhcp/client.c. It copies a fixed NS_MAXDNAME (1025) bytes from a DHCPv6 DOMAIN_LIST (option 24) value into a 1026-byte stack buffer dns_name regardless of the actual option length, then walks DNS labels with an unbounded \"c += jump + 1\" loop. A crafted DHCPv6 REPLY with a DOMAIN_LIST option of >= 1025 non-zero bytes makes the label walk leave the buffer and read/write '.' past its end in attacker-chosen strides. An on-link attacker can trigger this without authentication via a forged Router Advertisement (O=1) and a forged DHCPv6 REPLY matching xid/CLIENTID with a long DOMAIN_LIST. The impact is unauthenticated on-link crash of connmand (runs as root). This was introduced in bb06c47.","cvssScore":7.6,"cvssSeverity":"HIGH","cvssVector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H","cwes":["CWE-121"],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=bb06c47101ca243fa5c04fb4b03fe2a12420d280","tags":[]},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/tree/gdhcp/client.c","tags":[]},{"url":"https://lore.kernel.org/connman/179274561161.81299.4579745057858200074@pm.me/","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[],"hasPoc":false,"ai":null}