{"id":"CVE-2026-114606","published":"2026-10-22T17:16:58.413","lastModified":"2026-10-22T17:29:28.470","description":"draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content \"sniff\" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.","cvssScore":null,"cvssSeverity":null,"cvssVector":null,"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-200"],"vendors":[],"products":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio-desktop/commit/9c933514b8bcc90a91d88c685525a8885de4027e","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio-desktop/releases/tag/v31.4.4","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio-desktop/security/advisories/GHSA-fjgc-8xgj-rvh4","tags":[]}],"exploitRefs":[{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio-desktop/commit/9c933514b8bcc90a91d88c685525a8885de4027e","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio-desktop/releases/tag/v31.4.4","tags":[]},{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio-desktop/security/advisories/GHSA-fjgc-8xgj-rvh4","tags":[]}],"hasPoc":true,"ai":null}